Wow . . . man . . . that's, like [inhale] . . . so profound.

reading...

If the head of a robot is filled with every experience I have, and thereby is identical in every way to me, to the way I think, and yet I am alive at the moment it has download my life’s information, would I see the world from two points of being?

No, because you are not your past thoughts (your history). You only exist in time and space at the exact moment that you exist, so if you were to take your historical consciousness, as if it were one big log file, and dumped it into a computer (robot) that has the ability to exist in a conscious state, the robot's consciousness, while sharing your "log file", would exist in time and space only in so far as it is conscious.

Or would it the robot be a completely different person whose experiences are identical to my experiences? Something in us knows that I would not see the world from two points at the same time, and that another person with my being would be in the world

In order for this to be true, one would first have to state that your "being" is a finite object with which one could manipulate as if it were a piece of stone or paper. At best, you could merely hope to create a new conscious being that, at the moment of creation, faces its own reality and makes its own conscious decisions about how it chooses to be from moment to moment.

This, however, doesn't necessarily mean that consciousness is identity. Identity is a reflective concept while consciousness is an active state of being. It is only through reflection that one's consciousness of their consciousness allows one to create their own sense of identity.

To create a robot that is able to be conscious of its own identity where consciousness = identity would be to create a robot that is able to concsiously reflect on time and space while finitely existing within time and space. Thereby the robot would be God(like).

basically, the best you could hope for would be the creation of a black box (other) that would have absolutely no relation to you in any way.

This, however, doesn't necessarily mean that consciousness is identity. Identity is a reflective concept while consciousness is an active state of being. It is only through reflection that one's consciousness of their consciousness allows one to create their own sense of identity.

Charles, I agree with this, as it eloquently captures Hegel's refutation of Spinoza's absolute.

but this is my point: i meant a robot as a blank slate (sorry to bring up Locke, but you gave me no other choice). A robot with no previous experience and whose only experience is my experience. If everything that is in it is me then it should be nothing else but me, and not independent of me. But it does become independent of me, it becomes something else that is me at the same time. what i'm getting at is simply this: consciousness can not separated from the body. It is the body, not in the body.

a big chunk of cognitive science is like plato, it points up; whereas i'm always with the thinker who points to the world.

"But that does not answer or address the ultimate position factor of consciousness—the fact that the awareness of being is fixed."

A flawed initial supposition. Consciousness is not positionally fixed. Ask a race car driver where "he" is in the middle of a race. You will find that most such drivers experience "consciousness" as being outside of their physical form, and within the vehicle itself.

But more to your final point, I have to agree with charles @ 2: Continuity of consciousness is an illusion. Consciousness is a collapsed probability waveform, present only when it is being observed.

Allow me to present a similar thought experiment. Suppose I create 100 billion small devices designed to invade your body, seek out neurons in the brain and destroy them, but then immediately replace them functionally. One indistinguishable piece at a time, your brain is replaced with a mechanical device. At at any point do you cease to be "Charles" and become some other entity? Of course not. You have received, in every sense of the words, a prosthetic brain.

Now, what if I shut off all brain function and do the whole thing at once, then revive you? Who are you? Still Charles, of course.

Now, what if I do the whole thing in a completely non-destructive process, leaving the original Charles intact and simply creating a duplicate. Suddenly we have your case. And still, there is no reason to believe that the mechanical replacement would believe itself to be anything other than Charles, and it would be correct up to that point. Clearly though, it would go on from that point experiencing life from its own perspective, becoming a different person than the original, "meat", Charles.

This must mean identity (consciousness) is primarily positional and cannot, without a complete split of the personality, jump states of embodiment.

That is assuming that the two positions are not in communication with each other. If you can download yourself into a robot then you are at least capable of direct communication. Suppose you and your robot stay in direct communication. Now you have two independent yous, but now you share your combined experiences.

Now you are physically occupying two places in time and space but your conscious is in two places at the same time. Or you have one identity in two places. Are you two people or one person?

consciousness can not separated from the body. It is the body, not in the body.

Then what are dreams? Are they not a consciousness that is seperate from your body made only from your past?

reading...

If everything that is in it is me then it should be nothing else but me, and not independent of me.

but, really, aren't you or I no-"thing"? by being a thinking thing is one nothing but consciousness? Is there any "you" to be "in"? I guess I'm a little confused by how a robot with a "scraped tablet" could exist as you unless (and my apologies if i'm a little slow on the uptake here) you're suggesting that your consciousness would be somehow ported into the robot in real time... like a mirrored track in time? not like a copy into the robot and hit "play" and then the robot exists as if it was born, but rather the robot's consciousness would start in a blink exactly as your consciousness. if this is in fact what you were originally suggesting, then I would still hold that the robot's active state of being would still only be identity upon reflection by the thinking being, which would keep you and the robot separate for at the flash of creation the milisecond of reflection would separate the two of your by an infinite, unbridgeable gap. its consciousness would exist in its own existint-reflecting state.

personally, I would throw out the whole question of consciousness' relation to the body entirely. I would hold that consciousness as an active state isn't in the body, but nor would I consider it the body itself either. Why should the body be relevant when considering consciousness and its nature?

reading @5...

If you can download yourself into a robot then you are at least capable of direct communication. Suppose you and your robot stay in direct communication. Now you have two independent yous, but now you share your combined experiences.

But how would the relation between you and your robot self be any different than a relation between yourself and a complete stranger? All you'd be doing is creating a new Other that from the moment it gains consciousness is existing with its own freedom to choose to exist in many different ways, none of which are *you*.

It sounds like you don't have a beef with cognitive science as much as you have a beef with adolescent science fiction. If "book after book on cognitive science" really failed to address this exercise, you'd certainly have someone else---perhaps a philosopher of consciousness or (gasp!) an actual scientist---to cite other than William Gibson.

But until "The Cartoon Guide to Daniel Dennett" hits the shelves, that seems unlikely.

I prefer "Susan Blackmore For Dummies".

N, i actually do have other scientists but i do not want lose the reader and so Gibson is useful because he explains my point and is recognizable. as for "book after book," I should have said "paper after paper."

charles and BC, i want to address your points but i have to go to a movie screening. i will have something to say when i get back.

god, what a baby. are you gonna cry? huh, baby?

I was going to point out the fact this more-tugid-than-usual rumination from Mudede simply begs the question, "what is position?" but I see someone beat me to it.

Charles, next time, less name-dropping, more Brains In Jars. They're the only sure-fire gimmick if you want to liven up a bit of creaky old mind-body gasbaggery.

My readings of cognitive science/neuroscience have not at all left me with the impression that everyone is still belaboring a mind/body split. I thought it was just Marvin Minsky.

Have you read George Lakoff on cognitive science and philosophy? Embodied consciousness is his mantra.

mvb, is lakoff the chinese box guy?

mvb, the chinese box guy is john searle. and, admittedly, minsky is who i had in mind. but minsky had a big impact on cognitive science.

in hard science, the mind/body split is dead, but it still haunts philosophy, which is almost dead.

Charles,
I'm not sure what you mean by "still haunts," since dualism is not currently widely advocated by professional philosophers. Sure, it's still a topic for some philosophers of mind, but NO TOPIC ever really dies in philosophy, but just becomes marginal.

Nice to hear that philosophy is almost dead, too, thanks.

Sorry, Charles, I was called away. Yeah, the chinese box guy is John Searle. That's one of my favorite arguments by analogy, since it illustrates how fruitless arguments by analogy typically are.

I'll tell you, if Lakoff, Johnson, et al, are even half right, much of philosophy may well need to stock up on embalming fluid. The ontological shift is profound.

To think that the brain and it's activity and memories are all that we are disposes of the rest of your body which is just as valuable to your existence and how you experience your life. To entertain the fantasy of downloading all your thoughts and memories into a super computer/robot and it would be the same as you is like I said fantasy. We all have aches and pains in our bodies like backaches, problems with a finger or some joint or maybe an ulcer or maybe some of us are very flexible and able to do amazing things. All these many physical attributes or problems we have are just one part of who we are as human beings and contribute to what we experience and are capable of experiencing. My experience in the body I have now is different that a physicaly handicaped person it is not just the brain and it's thoughts. To duplicate someone and be exactly like the original we would have to feel that small nagging pain that happens when some of us walk or some other ailment or great physical ability because that effects what we do or do not do it contributes to each one of us as an individual. Just having a brain in a robot does not make the same person because the same physical abilities are not present to make up a certain individual. My brain placed in a robot that can lift a car or do some other crazy thing physically immediately would start the robot on a completely different life.
the bodies we have make up just as much who we are as the brain to entertain the idea that we can place all out thoughts and memories into something else means we do not like what we have now, our sense of self and individuality. One look in a mirror from a duplicate of yourself would see something so shocking because it is expecting the same face to be staring back with exactly the same wrinkles or characteristics that the duplicate would probably deteriorate into mental illness from the shock. Imagine waking up tomorrow and looking in a mirror and it is not you it is a machine and you had no choice in this thing that happened. You would not be able to take it mentally. Unless you were told in advance but then you would be faced with wanting to choose the body or robot you want to be in meaning you hate the one you have now Creating another dilemma if the person was unstable and hated themselves. If they got to choose something they really wanted to be physically then would not the self hatred of an unstable person then seek out his other self and kill it because it could not stand it in the first place.

Another dreamy and poetic post. I don't really understand about artificial intellgence but Phillip K. Dick is one of my favorite writers. Charles is even more profound that Phillip K. Dick.