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And isn't there some Constitutional argument why legal polygamy would be untenable?
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Medical science tells us, male and female brains are different. They work differently. Evolutionary biology tells us the male and female reproductive strategies are very different and conflicting. Sociology and psychology tell us that there are deep behavioral differences between men and women, whether those are social constructs or genetics, the fact is they're real. Do you not feel that it's appropriate for society to have a special, and I'll just use the word, favoritism, for heterosexual relations because heterosexual pair bonds need to overcome that gap, and because they're useful for reproductive purposes to perpetuate the society. A struggle which does not, by definition, exist in a same-sex relationship because people in same-sex relationships have opted out of the struggle.
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I think it is incorrect to see marriage simply as a legal institution.Yes and no. Much about my wife's and my marriage has nothing to do with the law. But so far as my marriage is legally recognized, it is a legal institution. And while the extra-legal aspects of my marriage couldn't be more different from, say, the long-absent Seattleblues's matrimonial sham, the attendant legal benefits and recognitions are essentially identical.
People have been getting married for a lot longer than they have been making laws.And not always, we might note, according to strict one man/one woman definitions.
Modern legal institutions like a corporation or even the notion of land ownership are incomprehensible to tribes of hunter-gathers. Not so with marriage.Obfuscating, though I think not deliberately. Once you have a tribe, you have a de facto government. At the very least, reference to tribes amounts to a concession that it is a social construct.
Brian Brown and Maggie Gallagher argue that marriage is a universal human institution that transcends any single faith or culture.Perhaps. But the cultural institution of law, particularly in a society that claims to honor free exercise of religion (and therefore irreligion) oughtn't to turn the blunt instrument of the state to the niceties of transcendence. If the state is to recognize marriage at all, it should limit itself to its material implications. I know of no one qualified to act, alone or through government, as my moral or metaphysical arbiter . . . or as yours.
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The argument is that marriage equality will make marriage more about the emotional gratification of the adults involved in the relationship and less about the responsibility parents have to bring up their children.Doesn't allowing the elderly, medically infertile, or voluntarily childless to marry already do that? It seems to me that such allowances display a recognition that the other social benefits provided by married households (they tend to commit fewer crimes, rely less on social services, raise property values, etc.) are worth preserving even in the absence of progeny.
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The one constant is that marriage always involves one man, one or more women, and babies.Except that babies are not a constant; nor can we say in good faith that babies have ever been a constant. At any given time, less than half of all marriages have progeny. Now we might account for new marriages where children simply haven't been born yet, or marriages in which children had been planned for but haven't arrived for medical reasons, but the fact remains that, statistically, most marriages at any given time are childless, and some percentage of those childless marriages were almost certainly intended as such.
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On the other hand, in his view, homosexuals are a group of people who do not and can not advance the interests of society by forming proper families.Again, I have to ask--what is a proper family? What is the empirically demonstrable benefit to society of making progeny; what foundational value--that is, what "objective" value (no such thing, really, since all value is assigned, but for our purposes, "objective" can refer to that which satisfies the broadest possible array of subjective values), without which society cannot cohere, does making more organisms serve? Conversely, could we not say that any two or more people who forgo the benefits of single lifestyle in the interest of forming stable households, consolidating resources, and offering civilization all of the benefits I cite in #112 constitutes a "proper family," so far as we're suggesting that proper families constitute a social good?
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Why should everything be judged by the amount of 'social good' it provides?Not everything should. But in the case of the legal marriage contract, special rights are bestowed. If government is going to give something--through subsidy, special rights, whatever--it seems like it should have to pass some sort of test. And better "social good" than "moral good," right?
Everyone should butt out as long as it's not hurting anybody (e.g. pedophilia) or 'taking anything away from the others' . . .I absolutely agree, so long as we're talking about what should be allowed. But so far as marriage is something we allow, gays are "allowed" to be married--they can hold a ceremony, open a joint account, move into a house together, and so on. Once we get into the web of legal rights that accompany this contract, we're talking about something else--a bestowal, if you will. Now, I happen to think that same-sex couples should receive this, and I think my arguments as to why are pretty clear.
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I don't think anybody except, perhaps, a Ron Paul-libertarian would argue that facilitating the formation of stable two-parent families is not a legitimate public policy goal.I don't know about that. I'm a mass-transit hungry, universal healthcare supporting, same-sex-marriage advocating sort, and I'm not particularly convinced that stable two-parent families represent a public policy interest. But I believe that it CAN be a legitimate public policy interest, depending entirely on what we're comparing it to. What I'm saying is that it stable two-parent families cannot be demonstrated to be preferable, in any way that legitimately falls under the heading of civic law, to childlessness. It is preferable (probably) to procreating willy-nilly without regard to commitment or the creation of stable households, but that interest is no less served if same-sex couples are granted the same recognitions as the childless heterosexual couples, from which they are functionally indistinguishable, currently receive.
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