My last philosophical problem for 2009: We know that Virno's concept of the general intellect resolves "the one" as conceptualized by Hegel. It resolves it by reversing it. Meaning, in Hegel all is becoming one, becoming unified, becoming the absolute, which for Hegel is the only truth—a part of the all is, according to this system, incomplete, false, inadequate (in the Spinozistic sense—Spinoza being Hegel without history, or Hegel being the solution of Spinoza and Vico). With Virno, the all, or the one, precedes the individual. And so the one is something like Simondon's pre-individual elements—or, the one can be seen as the common, what is common to all: language, genetic materials, biosemotics, air, matter, culture. What I would like to do is to think of this pre-individual stuff, the base of the individuating process, in the terms of Leibniz's fantastic theory of compossibility. The one is composed of competing compossibles (I picture it as a kind of quantum foam), and what becomes an individual is nothing else than an alliance of a set of compossibles, and this set is made up of pre-individual elements. That is my last philosophical thought of the year.
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